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ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
BECAUSE MRS DID NOT GIVE UP ITS RIGHT TO REASONABLE POST JUDGMENT ATTORNEY'S FEES
INCURRED IN ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT ON ITS JUDGMENT.
A.

This Court Should Exercise Free Review On Appeal.
This case presents a complex procedure for determining the standard of review. First,

the Magistrate Court was to apply a standard of review on the motion for reconsideration.
Second, the District Court, sitting as an appellate court, was to apply a standard of review of the
Magistrate Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration. Third, this Court is to apply a
standard of review of the District Court1s appellate decision.
Likely because this case involves awarding attorney's fees, MRS, the Olsens, and the
District Court wrongly asserted at the District Court level on appeal that the "abuse of
discretion" standard often applied to attorney's fees decisions applies here. The Olsens
continue to apply the "abuse of discretion" standard before this Court. However, for the
reasons set forth below, MRS believes this is wrong, and this Court should apply free review of
the Magistrate Court's reconsideration of MRS' Motion for Award of Supplemental Attorney's
Fees.
When a trial court decides a motion for reconsideration, it must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 (2012). MRS filed a motion for
reconsideration on its Motion for Award of Supplemental Attorney's Fees. Normally, the
"awarding of attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion of
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trial court and subject to

of

a statute
question of law.

1431daho

."' Ransom

applies to a

set

is a

Id.

Here, the Magistrate Court applied Idaho Code§ 12-120(5) to the facts of this case and
in the context of an agreement between Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall in determining that MRS could
not recover post judgment fees. Accordingly, the Magistrate Court should have applied a free
review standard on the motion for reconsideration. It further follows that the District Court
should have applied and this Court should now apply a free review standard on appeal because
the application of law to facts presents a question of law, and on appeal "[t]he standard of
review for questions of law is one of free review." Id.
Moreover, "where contract terms are clear and unambiguous, the interpretation of a
contract's meaning is a question of law." Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 192 (1996). And
111

[t]he determination and legal effect of a contractual provision is a question of law."' Straub v.

Smith, 145 Idaho 65 (2007) (quoting Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604,611 (2005)).

Given that this case involves the interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous
agreement between Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall and applying that agreement to Idaho Code § 12120(5), this case presented a question of law to the Magistrate Court, the District Court on
appeal, and now this Court. Importantly, this Court exercises free review over issues of law.
Sky Canyon Properties, LLC. v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC., 159 Idaho 162 (2015).

B.

The Olsens Agree That A Judgment Creditor Is Entitled To Recover Fees For Its
Necessary Efforts To Collect On A Judgment.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(5), a judgment creditor has a right to recover an

award of post judgment fees incurred attempting to collect on its judgment. The Olsens do not
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page 4
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this general proposition. The
its right to post judgment fees

issue
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is to

to

is
on

MRS gave
judgment

without first discussing the issue of post judgment fees with the Olsens.
C.

The Olsens Wrongly Argue That MRS Cannot Recover Post Judgment Fees Because MRS
Did Not Either 11) Discuss Such Fees So As To Reach A "Meeting Of The Minds" Or (2)
Receive An Award Of Such Fees Before Agreeing To Take Payments On The Judgment.
The Olsens' position on appeal follows both the lower Courts' reasoning for denying

MRS post judgment fees. Although the Olsens provide variations of their position in many
different ways throughout their Brief, the Olsens state their position best as follows:
"If MRS wanted to ensure that post judgment attorney fees were paid as part of
that debt settlement agreement, then, as the Magistrate Court stated, MRS would need
to make sure that it specifically included discussion of the attorney fees so that they
were included in the parties 1 'meeting of the minds 1 regarding the payment agreement.
Alternatively, it could have applied for an award of post judgment fees and costs prior to
making the agreement, so that the fees were automatically included in the judgment." 1
At its core, the Olsens 1 argument is that whenever a judgment creditor has incurred post
judgment fees in collecting on the judgment, and the judgment creditor agrees to accept
payments on the judgment until paid in full in exchange for not enforcing the judgment under
Idaho law, the judgment creditor must (1) specifically discuss post judgment fees so that the
parties "minds

meet,1 (i.e., reach agreement) regarding the payment agreement on the fee
1

issue; or (2) the judgment creditor must apply for an award of post judgment fees before
making the agreement.
The rule the Olsens ask this Court to impose is that a judgment creditor who does not
satisfy either of these two points cannot recover post judgment fees, as a matter of law, even

1

Respondent's Brief at p. 16. The Olsens make the same argument in different ways throughout their brief on
pages 20, 21, 25-26.
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result the Olsens seek to achieve. In other words, under a straight contract analysis, the
Olsens do not have a leg to stand on especially given this Court's reasoning in Straub v. Smith.
In Straub, this Court applied contractual principles of interpretation to a stipulation
stating that "if possible, the intent of the parties should be ascertained from the language of
the agreement as the best indication of their intent." Id. at 69. The Court in Straub used a
contractual analysis to determine that a prevailing party was entitled to seek fees where the
stipulation between the parties was silent on the issue whether either party could seek fees.
Here, like in Straub, the Court should use a contractual analysis and determine that MRS is
entitled to recover post judgment fees because the agreement between the parties is silent on
the issue of fees.
The balance of this Brief will be spent on explaining why the rule Olsens ask this Court to
impose is inconsistent with the facts, Idaho law, and sound public policy.
1.

The 0/sens admit the parties had no agreement on the fee issue but seek a result
as if there were an agreement precluding MRS from recovering fees.

In at least three instances in their Brief, the Olsens state that MRS did not to raise the
issue of post judgment fees during the discussions between Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall so there
could be a "meeting of the minds" on the post judgment fees issue. 2 "Meeting of the minds" is
another way of saying "agreement between the parties." Frankly, the Olsens' argument on this
point is an admission consistent with the undisputed facts that MRS' not raising the issue
precluded any agreement between the parties on whether the Olsens' payments paid only the
2

Respondent's Brief at pp. 16, 23, and 25.
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fact
payments satisfied not

the

judgment but also any post judgment fees MRS could have recovered, the Olsens ask this Court
to rule as if there were such an agreement between the parties
The Olsens' position is also inconsistent with other arguments the Olsens raise on
appeal. Specifically, the Olsens state at page 22 of their Brief: "In this case, the Magistrate
Court held that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties that paying off the
judgment in the agreed manner would satisfy the debt." 3 It is inconsistent for the Olsens to
argue repeatedly that there can be no "meeting of the minds" where MRS did not raise the
issue of post judgment fees, yet at the same time argue that the Magistrate Court correctly
held there was a "meeting of the minds." Given the undisputed facts that the parties never
discussed post judgment fees, the only congruent argument is that the parties had no
agreement on the post judgment fees issue, and the Magistrate Court got it wrong.
2.

Both the lower Courts and the Olsens incorrectly conclude that the Olsens
reasonably relied on MRS' silence.

The Olsens argue that the Magistrate Court correctly found that "upon reaching that
oral agreement, they [Mr. Hall and the Olsens] acted in reliance upon that contract and made
those payments based on that without any assertion that there would be additional attorney's
fees at the end." 4 But "[s]ilence ordinarily does not establish acceptance without knowledge
that silence is a mode of acceptance and the offeree intends to accept." Figueroa v. Kit-San Co.,
123 Idaho 149, 156 (Ct. App. 1992).

3

4

Respondent's Brief at pp. 22-23.
Respondent's Brief at pp. 18.
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In an attempt to distinguish
argue that

well-established Idaho
on the

the facts

this case,

of reliance "was not

believed that MRS would not seek fees, but rather that the Olsens made a year-long
course of semi-monthly payments without any assertion by MRS that it would seek attorney
fees at the end of those payments." 5
No matter how the Olsens couch the argument, one party's silence does not establish
acceptance of a contractual term. Here, the Olsens agree that the "evidence is undisputed that
MRS made no mention about its intent to increase the judgment by obtaining an award of post
judgment attorney fees." 6 Although the Olsens may have relied on MRS' silence on this issue,
such reliance was not reasonable under Idaho law nor did the term MRS was silent about
become a part of the agreement. See also Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65 (2007)(holding that
there was nothing in a stipulation between the parties that silence indicated an intent that the
prevailing party would forego the opportunity to pursue fees from the court).

3.

The Olsens fol/ow the Magistrate Court's analysis that unreasonably and
illogically expands the plain terms of the agreement that MRS' accepting
payments to satisfy the iudgment also satisfied al! existing obligations known to
MRS including a claim for post iudgment fees.

The facts are undisputed that "MRS agreed not to take Mr. Hall's deposition in exchange
for Mr. Hall's personal commitment to have his firm make, on behalf of the Olsens, two $250
payments monthly until the judgment had been paid in full" and that the "discussion that led
to that agreement contained no reference, one way or the other, about supplemental attorney

5
6

Respondent's Brief at p. 18.
Respondent's Brief at p. 18.
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117

added).

at

is
judgment

in

the

and the Magistrate Court (upheld by the District Court) have expanded the plain terms
of the agreement so that payments on the judgment not only satisfied the judgment but also
any obligation by the Olsens to pay post judgment fees.
It is important for this Court to understand precisely how this happened. At the hearing
on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Magistrate Court found "[tJhe agreement in this case
was for the satisfaction of a debt. There was an agreement that if Hall and his firm paid a
certain amount, and paid off the debt, that th at would satisfy the debt and resolve the issues.,, 8
However, the parties never agreed to accept payments in satisfaction of "the debt.,, The
parties agreed to accept payments "until the judgment had been paid in full." Moreover, there
is no evidence that the parties agreed that payment of the judgment in full would resolve any
issues beyond payment of the judgment.
The Magistrate Court next found that "at the time the agreement was made for the
satisfaction of the debt, everything was known to Medical Recovery Services, and they agreed
to allow payments to satisfy the then existing judgment as satisfaction of the debt." 9 Based on
this, the Magistrate Court denied MRS' request for post judgment fees. In essence, the
Magistrate Court is saying that the agreement was for satisfaction of "the debt,, which included
everything known to MRS and specifically MRS' claim for post judgment fees. Therefore,
according to the Magistrate Court, when MRS agreed to take payments to satisfy the judgment,

7

Respondent's Brief at pp. 7-8.

TR Vol. I, p. 38 LL. 14-18.
9 TR Vol. I, p. 39 LL. 3-7.
8
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M

M

But MRS agreed only to accept payments until the judgment was paid in full-nothing
more and nothing less. The Magistrate Court unreasonably and illogically expanded the
agreement to mean that satisfaction of the judgment also included satisfaction of "the debt,"
i.e., all claims MRS knew it had against the Olsens at the time the parties entered the
agreement including a claim for post judgment fees. The factual record on appeal does not
support this broad sweeping conclusion nor does the Magistrate Court's conclusion logically
follow from the facts. This is particularly true given the fact that Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith never
discussed the issue of post judgment fees, satisfaction of "the debt," or anything besides
payments on the judgment.
On appeal, the Olsens follow the Magistrate Court's analysis explaining that "[t]he court
implied from that undisputed evidence that the existing judgment was the debt it referred to,
and that in satisfying the judgment by its payments, the Olsens that would be satisfying the
debt." 10 But neither the Olsens nor the Magistrate Court can reasonably imply from the facts of
this case that MRS agreed not to seek post judgment fees when MRS accepted $500 per month
payments until the judgment was paid in full. Again, Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith never discussed
the issue of post judgment fees, satisfaction of "the debt," or anything besides payments on the
judgment.

4.

10

Payment of the iudqment does not mean payment of post iudqment fees or
preclude recovery of post judgment fees.

Respondent's Brief at p. 14.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 10
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Code§
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right to

1111

However, the Olsens are wrong when they state that "MRS'

argument is unconvincing." 12 Idaho Code§ 12-120(5) states, in part, that post judgment fees
"shall be set by the court following the filing of a memorandum of attorney's fees and costs
with notice to all parties and hearing." This Court has held that "costs and attorney fees are
collateral issues which do not go to the merits of an action and that a district court retains
jurisdiction to make such an award after a suit has been terminated." Straub, supra, 145 Idaho
at 69. In other words, the award of attorney's fees is a separate and distinct right and even
collateral to the action or judgment itself.
This proposition is so clear that even the Olsens end up arguing in favor of it in their
Brief when they state:
The judgment in this case included prejudgment attorney fees and costs,
because they were approved by the court. But both when the agreement regarding
paying the judgment was made, and at the time final payment was made on the
judgment, no post judgment attorney fees had been so approved. Accordingly, they did

not and could not have formed any part of the iudqment. 13
The Olsens' reliance on I.R.C.P. 54 is misplaced because Idaho Code§ 12-120(5} governs
the fee issue, not Rule 54. The Olsens appear to argue that under Rule 54 fees automatically
become part of the judgment when approved by the court. Since the court did not approve any
post judgment fees before the judgment was paid, there is no judgment to which post
judgment fees now can be added. The problem with this argument is that Rule 54 addresses

11
12
13

Respondent's Brief p. 14.
Respondent's Brief p. 15.
Respondent's Brief p. 16 (Emphasis added).
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fees whereas

Code§
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issue in

not

not

The Olsens ask this Court to impose a rule that would deny a judgment creditor the right
to recover post judgment fees whenever a judgment debtor pays a judgment in full. In other
words, a judgment creditor could spend considerable effort attempting to collect on a
judgment just to have the judgment debtor pay the judgment in full. Under the Oisens' theory,
a judgment creditor could not seek post judgment fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(5) because
they could not be added to the judgment that the judgment debtor has satisfied. Such a rule
would thwart the entire policy behind Idaho Code§ 12-120(5).

5.

The Olsen's ask this court to shift their duty onto MRS.

The Olsens argue that "If MRS wanted to ensure that post judgment attorney fees were
paid as part of that debt settlement agreement, then, as the Magistrate Court stated, MRS
would need to make sure that it specifically included discussion of the attorney fees .... " 14
Stated differently, "if MRS wanted to ensure that the debt being satisfied meant something
other than the judgment as it then existed, MRS had the obligation to make that clear so that
there would be a meeting of the minds of the parties that the debt was not merely the existing
judgment." 15 In other words, the Olsens argue that if MRS wanted to "ensure" that the
settlement agreement included post judgment fees or some amount more than the judgment
as it then existed, MRS had the duty to discuss that issue and include it in the agreement. 16

14
15
16

Respondent's Brief at p. 16.
Respondent's Brief at p. 21.
Nothing in the record supports the argument that MRS wanted the Olsens to pay something more than the
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in

context
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MRS seeks such an award. Idaho Code§ 12-120(5). No Idaho law confers on the Olsens a right
to be free of post judgment fees in this case. Thus, on the issue of post judgment fees, MRS
had a right, and the Olsens had no right.
Given that MRS had a right to recover post judgment fees, and the Olsens had no right
to be free of post judgment fees, the duty to raise the issue lies squarely on the Oisens if they
wanted MRS to forego its right to recover post judgment fees. In other words, if anyone
wanted to "ensure" that the agreement included payment of the judgment and any post
judgment fees that MRS had a right to recover, the Olsens were the ones who had the duty to
raise the issue, not MRS. MRS had no duty to raise the issue because MRS already had a right
to recover post judgment fees by statute unless MRS waived its right or contractually settled its
right away. The Olsens' proposed rule unjustifiably shifts their duty onto MRS.
To illustrate who has the duty to raise the issue seeking a waiver of fees, this Court can
turn to then Chief Justice Eismann's special concurring opinion in Straub. Justice Eismann
stated that "Straub's counsel bears some responsibility for the short-circuiting of the
procedures. Every attorney worth his or her salt knows that if you want to dismiss your
complaint just before trial and do not want your client to be liable for the defendant's court
costs and attorney fees, you had better seek a stipulation stating that each party will bear their
own costs and attorney fees." Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 73 (2007) (Eismann, J.,
concurring).
judgment at the time the parties entered the agreement. Wanting post judgment fees before the judgment is
even satisfied is like putting the "cart before the horse."
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 13
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that if you want to

or
efforts

a

you want to

judgment fees for your client, you had better seek a stipulation stating that payment of the
judgment, as agreed, includes payment of any post judgment fees that the judgment creditor
might recover. Moreover, what Justice Eismann did not say is equally as important. Justice
Eismann did not say, as the Magistrate and District Courts said here, that if the party with a
right to seek fees wants to ensure its right to seek fees it would need to specificaily discuss that
issue with opposing counsel so that the issue of fees would be included in the parties' "meeting
of the minds."

6.

MRS did not have any knowledge unknown to the 0/sens.

In an attempt to appeal to the Court's collective sense of justice, the Olsens argue that
MRS has something akin to "superior knowledge" on the issues of post judgment fees. In this
regard, the Olsens state that "it is clear that MRS knew it had a right to attorney fees under
Idaho Code§ 12-120(5),"and "MRS's attorneys were surely aware of the nature and extent of
their post judgment collection efforts since they had both undertaken those efforts and had
discussed them with both Mr. Olsen and Mr. Hall over the year prior to the agreement." 17 The
Olsens make these statements attempting to persuade the Court that MRS knew facts that the
Olsens did not know and therefore took advantage of the Olsens by not disclosing this "superior
knowledge."
What the Olsens fail to mention is that both parties had the same knowledge.
Specifically, since both Mr. Olsen and Mr. Hall are also attorneys, they are deemed to have

17

Respondent's Brief at pp. 17-18.
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the

to

r

Mr.
nature and extent of the post judgment collection efforts since they had been party to and
witnessed those efforts and had discussed them with MRS over the year prior to the
agreement.
Because both parties and their counsel were deemed to know the law regarding post
judgment fees and had actual knowledge of the post judgment collection efforts undertaken by
MRS, the Olsens and the lower Courts' arguments regarding MRS' "superior knowledge" is
without merit. It also follows that since the Olsens also had this knowledge, it was incumbent
on the Olsens' counsel to have raised the post judgment fee issue during the discussions with
Mr. Smith at the time the parties made the agreement to make payments on the judgment.

7.

MRS has not raised new issues for the first time in this appeal.

The Olsens argue that "MRS's arguments have expanded dramatically since the District
Court Appeal." 18 However, the record shows that MRS has not raised any new issues for the
first time on appeal. The Olsens claim that "MRS now argues that the denial of attorney fees
where the subject of attorney fees was not expressly discussed by the parties constituted an
improper judicial determination of waiver, based on Straub v. Smith." 19 The record shows this
is not a new argument as even the Olsens point out that "[i]n its argument to the District Court
on appeal ... MRS argued that the magistrate court improperly implied into the agreement
between the parties a waiver by MRS of its right to seek post judgment attorney fees." 20 MRS

18

19

20

Respondent's Brief at p. 23.
Respondent's Brief at p. 24.
Respondent's Brief at pp. 21.
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only cited a new case, Straub v. Smith, in support of the waiver issue.
The Olsens further argue that MRS impermissibly raises for the first time on appeal the
attorney work-product doctrine and case law regarding when a party has a duty to speak. The
central issue of this case is the lower courts' imposition of a duty on a judgment creditor to
discuss post judgment fees with a judgment debtor to reach a "meeting of the minds" or obtain
an award of post judgment fees before agreeing to payments on a judgment. MRS raises
argument about the work-product doctrine and case law regarding when a party has a duty to
speak not as new issues but as further reasons why this Court should reject the Olsens'
proposed rule.
D.

The Olsens' Proposed Rule Is Against Sound Public Policy.

The Olsens' proposed rule would unnecessarily increase the work load for the courts
and counsel. Specifically, attorneys attempting to collect on judgments and who want to seek
post judgment fees for their clients would be required to file a motion for post judgment fees
after every attempt to collect the judgment just to preserve the ability to recover post
judgment fees to make their clients whole. Under the Olsens' proposed rule, attorneys would
practice "defensive filing" for post judgment fees because an attorney's client could consider
failing to file such a motion to be malpractice. In turn, the courts would be required to process
and hold hearings on post judgment fee requests that could otherwise be consolidated in a
single motion resulting in judicial economy. Moreover, many judgment debtors never pay their
21

22

R Vol. I, pp. 188-91.
Appellant's Brief on Appeal pp. 13-17.
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The Olsens' proposed rule will discourage or at least delay settlements when sound
public policy encourages parties to settle legal disputes. Under the Olsens' proposed rule, an
attorney for a judgment creditor may refuse to set up payments on a judgment until the court
has awarded post judgment fees-especially when an attorney does not represent a judgment
debtor. In these instances, the judgment creditor may first want to make a motion for post
judgment fees so that the attorney for the judgment creditor will not be accused of overstating
or misrepresenting the unliquidated post judgment amount of fees. This is especially true given
the rise in claims against attorneys under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's imposition of
strict liability for false or misleading representations regarding a debt. See ABA Law Trends and
News Practice Area Newsletter: Attorney Liability Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 23
The Olsens' proposed rule could place the attorney at ethical and legal risk. Judgment
debtors acting without counsel do not understand terms of art like judgment, satisfaction,
motion, etc. If an attorney for a judgment creditor is required to discuss the issue of post
judgment fees before setting up payments on a judgment, the attorney could soon be
explaining post judgment collection fees, post judgment procedure, how much a court awards,
etc. A judgment debtor could see this as legal advice-for example, a judgment debtor could
claim, "the attorney advised me to pay $500 additional attorney's fees. He said this was a

23

H. Ronald Klasko, Attorney Liability Under the Fair Debt collection Practices Act,
http://www.americanba r .org/ news Ietter /publications/law_trends_news_practice_ area_ e_newsletter _home/10 _s
pring_bl_feat2.html
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what

court

n

Or a judgment debtor could

in

claims

or even

the attorney.
The Olsens' proposed rule violates the public policy behind the attorney work-product
doctrine. The public policy behind the attorney work-product doctrine is that nondisclosure of
an attorney's thoughts, opinions, mental impressions, and litigation strategy is necessary to the
effective administration of justice. If an attorney is required to disclose his client's right/intent
to seek post judgment fees, the attorney is really disclosing litigation strategy. Perhaps the
attorney believes that the best strategy to settle the case is to tell the judgment debtor about
post judgment fees and costs to encourage settling everything for payment of only the
judgment in full right now. Or perhaps the attorney believes the best strategy to make his
client whole is to have the judgment paid in full before pursuing the issue of post judgment
fees. In either event, requiring the attorney to make the disclosures that the Olsens ask this
11

Court to impose impedes the orderly administration of justice by applying a one size fits all"
approach that invades an attorney's litigation strategy for his client.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons and those set out in Appellant's Brief on Appeal, MRS
respectfully request that the decision of the District Court affirming the Magistrate Court's
Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration be reversed and that MRS be awarded its fees and
costs on appeal.
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